Qi Liu

Welcome! I am Qi Liu. I am a Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Government, Harvard University. I study international institutions and international political economy.

I am a Graduate Student Associate of Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and I am a Graduate Fellow at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and Princeton Sovereign Finance Lab.

I hold an M.A. in Political Science from Duke University and a B.A. in Economics (with a double degree in International Politics) from Peking University.

1. The Scope Expansion of International Organizations. Under Review
• Winner of the Best Paper in International Relations, Midwest Political Science Association
• Winner of the Kenneth J. Meier Award for the best paper in bureaucratic politics, public administration, or public policy, Midwest Political Science Association
Abstract
Global challenges such as climate change and artificial intelligence evolve rapidly, yet international organizations (IOs) respond unevenly. When do IOs adapt to new challenges, and why do some expand while others do not? Although states design IOs to address specific cooperation problems, bureaucracies operationalize these mandates and can reshape what IOs do in practice. I argue that IO bureaucrats are entrepreneurial but power-structured. They adapt selectively to global challenges in order to seek resources, attention, and recognition from the major principal state. Through changing staff expertise and tasking, they change the scope of their IO to address issues prioritized by the major principal. Empirically, I introduce job postings as a new measure of IO operations and compile an original dataset of 630,500 postings from 234 IOs (2007-2024). Using a difference-in-differences design exploiting the rising salience of climate and AI challenges, I show that IOs expand their scope only when the major principal prioritizes the issue. When the major principal's priority shifts away, the IO contracts. The study reveals how state power in IOs shapes the global governance agenda.

1. Moral Hazard in Global Cooperation Networks: Evidence from Bilateral Swap Agreements (with Xun Pang). Accepted, International Studies Quarterly.
Abstract
Globalization has intensified the cross-border transmission of financial risks, making the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) a central pillar of international economic stability. Bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) have proliferated since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, surpassing IMF resources and reshaping international financial cooperation. Despite widespread concerns that BSAs may generate moral hazard, systematic theoretical analyses and empirical evidence remain lacking. We develop a network-based argument of moral hazard, arguing that states' incentives to safeguard depend on their positions within the BSA network. We test this claim with an original dataset of global BSAs and causal inference techniques. The results reveal a dual dynamic: central creditor states increase their liquidity provision capacity by over 20 percentage points to stabilize the network, while peripheral debtor states decrease their self-insurance by approximately 8 percentage points, reflecting significant moral hazard. These findings reveal that BSAs simultaneously distribute liquidity provision pressure and redistribute risks. In doing so, they introduce a new source of fragility into global financial governance, transform the key currency system from unilateral reliance on the US toward burden-sharing among core central banks, and raise new challenges of domestic accountability.
2. China’s Bilateral Swap Agreements and Foreign Policy (with Xun Pang, James Raymond Vreeland). Review of International Political Economy (2026), 1-33.
Abstract
We examine the foreign-policy implications of China's expanding network of bilateral swap agreements (BSAs). BSAs provide a line of credit that governments can draw on during times of crisis. We suspect that entering a BSA with China can bring countries that have few outside options and have been left behind by the US-led economic order into closer alignment with China. Applying a Bayesian generalized synthetic control approach, we estimate both aggregate- and individual-level treatment effects for different sets of countries. We find that, on average, a country's participation in BSAs with China increases its short-run foreign-policy alignment with China. Comparisons of country-level causal effects reveal that the short-run effect and a medium-run finding are driven by financially vulnerable countries and those supportive of China's global leadership. The results suggest that the introduction of Chinese BSAs as part of the global financial safety net has political implications for international affairs.

1. Sovereign Risk and Chinese Capital: Bond Market Reactions to New Loans (with Layna Mosley). Under Review. [Featured in The Economist]
Abstract
When lending to sovereign governments, investors are especially attentive to default risk. We propose that investors react to the composition of existing debt, not just its overall level. We examine how bond markets respond to China's presence as a sovereign creditor, given features often associated with Chinese lending. Investors use news of Chinese loans as a heuristic, updating (and typically increasing) their risk assessments. Using event studies and text analysis of Standard \& Poor's ratings rationales from 2007-2022, we show that announcements of Chinese loans raise borrowing costs, especially for liquidity and budget-support loans and for governments aligned with China. Comparable announcements of World Bank loans, other bilateral credits, and new bond issues have no similar effect. These findings reveal that sovereign risk pricing depends not only on debt levels but also on creditor identities, highlighting how China’s rise as a major lender may constrain borrowers' access to bond-based finance.
2. Network Ties, Social Capital, and Multilateral Cooperation (with Christina Davis). Working Paper.
Abstract
What enables states to act collectively in multilateral fora? Each decision takes place within a broader set of interactions in international society that are shaped by power relationships and embedded within overlapping institutional commitments. Some states are highly connected, while others are isolated. Our goal is to identify these distinct social roles and assess their impact on collective action. We construct cooperation networks of defense alliances and intergovernmental organization (IGO) co-memberships from 1961 to 2014 as a measure of ties between states that build trust and reciprocity analogous to social capital at the individual level. Using a dynamic blockmodel, we identify latent groups of states with similar tie-formation profiles. These groups capture the social roles -- highly connected versus isolated -- that describe the position of states in cooperation networks. The model estimates the latent groups while accounting for shared interests that also lead them to form ties. We then test how group membership affects voting in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). States embedded in dense communities characteristic of high social capital exhibit greater voting cohesion on controversial resolutions across issue areas, whereas isolated states fail to coordinate. This pattern is strongest for defense alliances and IGO co-memberships; trade networks do not display the same property. In comparison with other groups, the voting cohesion among some members of the high density cooperation networks approaches that of members of Cold War alliance blocs, or members of small multilateral clubs such as the OECD or the AU. Our broader network-based measure provides a comprehensive perspective on the value of social capital for multilateral cooperation. These findings highlight the social foundations of multilateralism by demonstrating how cooperation networks support cohesive decision-making on critical issues.

1. Seeking New Principals: The Reorientation of International Organizations after Major State Withdrawal.
2. Imitate or Differentiate? Competition and the Scope of International Organizations.
3. Dynamic Bipartite Mixed Membership Stochastic Blockmodel Regression (with Kosuke Imai, Santiago Olivella, and Ruofan Ma). [Polmeth Poster 2025]
   Abstract

   Many political networks are bipartite and dynamic, arising from interactions between (rather than within) different types of nodes and evolving over time. Yet, existing studies often aggregate networks across types of nodes and/or multiple time periods, leading to potential aggregation bias. We introduce a dynamic bipartite mixed-membership stochastic blockmodel regression that preserves the bipartite network structure while allowing for temporal network evolution. Our methodology enables researchers to uncover time-varying latent group structures that exhibit distinct patterns of interactions. We apply the proposed model to the intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership network to evaluate how the pattern of international cooperation is structured. Our data cover approximately 200 countries and more than 400 IGOs from 1965 to 2014. Consistent with the literature, we find that democracies are more likely to join IGOs in general. In addition, we further identify geopolitical alignment with the U.S. as an important predictor of membership in the most influential and selective IGOs.